Radzik (1991) showed that, by strengthening the usual quasi-concavity assumption on players' payoff functions, upper semi-continuous two-player games on compact intervals of the real line have ε-equilibria for all ε > 0. Ziad (1997) then stated that the same conclusion holds for n-player games on compact, convex subsets of R m , m ≥ 1, provided that the upper semi-continuity condition is strengthened. Both Radzik's and Ziad's proofs rely crucially on the lower hemi-continuity of the ε-best reply correspondence. We show that: (1) in contrast to what is stated by Ziad, his conditions fail to be sufficient for the lower hemi-continuity of the approximate best-reply correspondence, (2) the approximate best-reply correspondence is indeed lower hemi-continuous if players' action spaces are polytopes, and (3) with action spaces as polytopes, Ziad's theorem can be stated so that it properly generalizes Radzik's theorem. * I wish to thank Erik Balder, Paulo Bárcia, Paulo Côrte-Real, Branko Grünbaun, Gil Kalai, Armando Machado, Luís Vasconcelos and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. Special thanks are due to an associate editor, whose comments greatly improved the paper. I thank also John Huffstot for editorial assistance. Any remaining error is, of course, my own.
Introduction
Classic existence results (e.g., Nash (1950) ) show that a normal-form game has a Nash equilibrium provided that two sets of conditions hold. First, each player's action space is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of a euclidean space. Second, each player's payoff function is jointly continuous and separately quasi-concave in his own action.
The goal of this note is to show that, for the existence of approximate equilibria in normal-form games with polytopes as action spaces, the continuity requirement on players' payoff functions can be weakened from joint continuity to joint upper semi-continuity by strengthening the quasi-concavity requirement.
Our results build upon those of Radzik (1991) and Ziad (1997) . In order to explain our results and how they relate to theirs, we briefly recall some game-theoretical and mathematical notions (Definitions 1 and 2, respectively). 
The symbol −i denotes "all players but i." In particular, X
3. Given a game G and ε ≥ 0, an ε-equilibrium of G is x * ∈ X such that u i (x * ) ≥ u i (x i , x * −i ) − ε for all i ∈ N and x i ∈ X i . A Nash equilibrium of G is an ε-equilibrium for ε = 0. 
For all ε > 0 and i ∈ N , the player i's ε-best-reply correspondence is BR

A correspondence β : X ⇒ Y is closed-valued if β(x) is closed for all x ∈ X.
It is lower hemi-continuous if the set {x ∈ X : β(x) ⊆ F } is closed for each closed subset F of Y . A closed-valued correspondence is upper hemi-continuous
if its graph is closed.
Recall, as well, that if β : X ⇒ X is such that β(x) is nonempty, compact and convex for all x ∈ X and X if finite-dimensional and compact, then: (1) If β is upper hemi-continuous, by Kakutani's fixed point theorem there is a fixed point x of β. (2) If β is lower hemi-continuous, then Michael's selection theorem implies that there is a continuous selection f of β. Radzik (1991) considers payoff functions that are jointly upper semi-continuous and separately quasi-concave in each player's own action. Radzik considers only two players, each with an interval as strategy set. He shows that these assumptions 1 For all subsets A of a topological space Y , cl(A) denotes the closure of A.
are not enough to guarantee the existence of an ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0. A solution to this existence problem can be obtained by strengthening upper semicontinuity to continuity since this would imply the existence of a Nash equilibrium using Kakutani's theorem. Radzik obtained an alternative solution by strengthening separate quasi-concavity to the following notion of piecewise quasi-concavity: For player 1, the compact interval X 2 that is the strategy set of player 2 is suitably covered by a finite number of intervals [b i , b i+1 ] so that player 1's payoff function u 1 is jointly quasi-concave on
] for all i (piecewise quasi-concavity of player 2's payoff function is defined analogously).
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His main result shows that if each player's payoff function is jointly upper semi-continuous and piecewise quasi-concave, then the game has an ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0.
Radzik proves his result by establishing that the ε-best reply correspondence is lower hemi-continuous, with nonempty, compact and convex values. Michael's selection theorem then implies that ε-best reply correspondence has a continuous selection, to which we can apply Brouwer's fixed point theorem to obtain an ε-equilibrium. Ziad (1997) also considers the existence of approximate equilibrium in normalform games. His setting is more general than that of Radzik (1991) since it allows for n players (not just two) and nonempty, convex, compact subsets of euclidean spaces as strategy spaces (not just compact intervals on the real line). He also extends the notion of piecewise quasi-concavity to this more general setting as follows: The finite cover of X −i by closed intervals is generalized to a finite cover by convex compact 2 Radzik has named this property strong quasi-concavity. While the property is a strengthening of separate quasi-concavity in each player's own action, the term strong quasi-concavity suggests that it is a strengthening of joint quasi-concavity, which it is not. For this reason, we refer to it as piecewise quasi-concavity.
3 When n = 2 and players' action spaces are intervals in R, this definition collapses into Radzik's presents its definition, which will be discussed below.
Definition 4 Player i's payoff function is
for all 
That is, we show that if player i's value function is piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave, then his value function is i-upper semi-continuous. Furthermore, we show that, in Radzik's setting each player's value function is piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave.
Thus, the sufficiency of the piecewise polyhedral quasi-concavity of V i for the i-upper semi-continuity of u i allows us to state an existence result for approximate equilibria of n-person games that simultaneously dispenses with the lower semi-continuity of u i altogether and generalizes Radzik's theorem.
Proposition 6 Let G be an n-player game such that for all i ∈ N , (1) X i is a polytope, (2) u i is upper semi-continuous and piecewise quasi-concave (Definitions 2 and 3), and (3) V i is piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave (Definition 5). Then, G has
an ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0.
In conclusion, in order to obtain the existence of an approximate equilibrium, the continuity of players' payoff function can be weakened to upper semi-continuity. This is the case when players' action spaces are polytopes and when players' payoff and value functions satisfy a form of quasi-concavity stronger than separate quasiconcavity in each player's own action. The usefulness of Proposition 6 therefore lies in games whose players' payoff functions do not satisfy any form of lower semi-continuity, but which are, in compensation, upper semi-continuous and satisfy a relatively strong form of quasi-concavity. In contrast, if players' payoff functions are discontinuous and separately quasi-concave in each player's own action but satisfy no stronger quasiconcave property, then one has to rely on the results of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Reny (1999) to establish the existence of equilibria.
Finally, we note that Proposition 6 is related to Theorem 2 of Gale, Klee, and Rockafellar (1968) , which, in particular, states that, for all closed convex subsets D of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space, every convex function on D is upper semicontinuous if and only if the intersection of D with any polytope is a polytope. This result implies that every concave function on a polytope is lower semi-continuous.
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This, in turn, implies the following existence result: If G is an n-player game such that for all i ∈ N , (1) X i is a polytope, (2) u i is upper semi-continuous and (3) there exists a finite cover of
for all l, then G has a Nash equilibrium. In fact, by their Theorem 2, u i would be lower semi-continuous on X i × X l −i for all l, and so on X = X i × X −i . Together with the upper semi-continuity of u i , this implies that u i is actually continuous and the existence of equilibrium follows from Kakutani's fixed point theorem. Thus, in comparison, Proposition 6 allows for compact convex partitions of X −i and it requires only quasi-concavity of u i on X i × X l −i but it only guarantees the existence of approximate equilibrium and it requires V i to be polyhedral quasi-concave on X l −i . More importantly, Proposition 6 allows for discontinuous payoff functions whereas the above existence result applies only to payoff functions that are, in effect, continuous.
5 Indeed, if D is a polytope, then D is convex and closed and its intersection with a polytope is also a polytope. Furthermore, if f : D → R is concave, then −f is convex. Thus, Theorem 2 of Gale, Klee, and Rockafellar (1968) implies that −f is upper semi-continuous and so f is lower semi-continuous. The reason why polytopes are important for Ziad's theorem is given in Lemma 9, which is a simple consequence of the characterization of polytopes that we provide in Proposition 8. The importance of Lemma 9 is that it allows us to establish the lower hemi-continuity of the ε-best reply correspondence (which, as explained in the introduction, implies the existence of an ε-equilibrium together with Michael's selection theorem and Brouwer's fixed point theorem).
We start by providing two characterizations of polytopes.
Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. P is a polytope; 2. P is compact, convex and satisfies the following property: for all x ∈ P , there exists r > 0 such that for allx ∈ P ,x = x,
P is compact, convex and all its extreme points are isolated.
The last condition in property 2 says that the ball of radius r intersected with the cone of all interior directions from x is a subset of P .
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Proof of Proposition 8. We will prove that 1 implies 2, 2 implies 3 and 3 implies 1. For convenience, let E(C) denote the set of extreme points of a convex set
C.
Property 2 implies 3 because if there were a sequence {x k } ∞ k=1 of extreme points of P converging to x, its elements would eventually be in an r/2-ball around x, but then its elements would not be extreme:
Property 3 implies 1 because P is equal to the convex hull of its extreme points and E(P ) is finite. Indeed, E(P ) is closed (see Rockafellar (1970, Corollary 18.1.1)) and clearly bounded; so, if it were to be infinite, then it would have an accumulation point, a contradiction to property 3.
In order to establish that property 1 implies 2, note that polyhedra (and so polytopes) are intersections of finitely many half-spaces.
Take r to be the smallest distance of x from the hyperplanes 
The following lemma is a simple consequence of Proposition 8 and is key to the proof of Theorem 7.
Lemma 9 Let P be a polytope,
The following two special cases illustrate the usefulness of Lemma 9. The first case (to be considered in the proof of Theorem 7 below) is obtained by letting α k = 1 for all k. Thus, in this case, we have a sequence {x k } ∞ k=1 contained in the polytope P , converging to a point x also in P . Lemma 9 then asserts that, for all k sufficiently large, each x k can be expressed as a convex combination between the limit point x and some other pointx k in P .
A second special case of interest (to be considered in the proof of Proposition 12 below) occurs when α k converges to zero. In this case, we have a sequence
converging to a point x in P with the property that α k x k + (1 − α k )x also belongs to P . Lemma 9 implies that x k must itself belong to P for all k sufficiently large:
In fact, for all k sufficiently large, each x k can be expressed as a convex combination between the limit point x and some other pointx k in P .
Proof of Lemma 9. Note first that whenever x k = x we can letx k = x and θ k = 1/k. Thus, we may assume that x k = x for all k ∈ N.
Let r > 0 be such that x + r(x − x)/||x − x|| ∈ P for allx ∈ P ,x = x. For
Finally, consider the case where {α k } ∞ k=1 is bounded away from zero. In this case, let K ∈ N be such that ||x k − x||
and, as before,
Clearly, θ k > 0 for all k and lim k θ k = 0, implying that θ k ∈ (0, 1) for sufficiently large k.
Note that ||x
and so lim kxk = x. It remains to show thatx k ∈ P for all k ≥ K.
≤ r/||x k − x||, which implies thatx k can be expressed as a convex combination of x and x + r(x k − x)/||x k − x||. Since the latter point belongs to P , thenx k also belongs to P .
Lemma 9, together with Ziad's original argument, allows us to prove Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7.
Let i ∈ N and let β i : X −i ⇒ X i be defined by Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 16.22, p. 535) , that BR ε i is lower hemi-continuous if and only if β i is lower hemi-continuous. In order to establish that β i is lower hemi-continuous, let F ⊆ X i be closed,
for all k sufficiently large. Taking a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that
) for all k sufficiently large. Suppose, in order to reach a contradiction, that there exists an infinite sequence {k j } j∈N such that u i (x
Taking a further subsequence if needed, we may assume that there exists
for all j such that ||x
) for all j sufficiently large, and so lim sup
contradicting the i-upper semi-continuity of u i . This contradiction establishes that 
is also nonempty, closed and convex. Furthermore, BR ε : X ⇒ X is lower hemi-continuous. Thus, by Michael's selection theorem, there exists a continuous selection f of BR ε . Hence, by Brouwer's fixed point theorem, f has a fixed point x and x is an ε-equilibrium of G.
We note that the only difference between the statement of Theorem 7 and the original statement in Ziad (1997) is that players' action spaces are now required to be polytopes (and not just a convex and compact subset of a euclidean space). As the following example shows, requiring the action spaces to be convex and compact is not sufficient to guarantee the lower hemi-continuity of the ε-best reply correspondence.
Example 10 Let G = (X 1 , X 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) be the following 2-player game. Let
and X 2 = [0, 1]. We denote x 1 = (x, y) and x 2 = z.
Let player 1's payoff function u
1 be defined by u 1 (x, y, z) = 0 for all (x, y, z) ∈ X 1 × X 2 .
We define player 2's payoff function as follows. Define
. The payoff function for player 2 is
Note that
Since f is strictly convex and continuous, X 1 is convex and compact. Clearly, X 2 is also compact and convex. Note that u 2 is quasi-concave
, is compact, and so u 2 is upper semi-continuous. Clearly, u 1 is both upper semi-continuous and quasi-concave.
We claim that u i is also i-upper semi-continuous for all i. It is clear that V 1 (z) = 0 for all z ∈ X 2 and V 2 (x, y) = 1 for all (x, y) ∈ X 1 , except when (x, y) = (1, 0), in which case V 2 equals 2. Condition (1) is trivially satisfied for player 1 and one can easily show that V 2 also satisfies it. To see this, let ( 0) . But, clearly, in this case we also have lim sup k V 2 (x k , y k ) = 2. Thus, it follows that V 2 satisfies condition (1) and so u 2 is i-upper semi-continuous.
for all (x, y) ∈ X 1 . Clearly, if g :
2 ) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1), while g(1, 0) = 1. Hence, it follows that BR ε 2 has no continuous selection. Since BR ε 2 (x, y) is nonempty, convex and compact for all (x, y) ∈ X 1 , it follows by Michael's selection theorem that BR ε 2 is not lower hemi-continuous. Before we conclude this section, we note that the above example can be easily modified to show that, even when action spaces are polytopes, the ε-best reply correspondence may fail to be lower hemi-continuous if players' payoff functions are not i-upper semi-continuous: 
3 Relationship between Radzik's and Ziad's Theorems As we have shown in the previous section, the polyhedral convexity of the action spaces is essential to the lower hemi-continuity of the ε-best reply correspondence and, therefore, to any approach to the existence of ε-equilibria based on that property. The importance of polyhedral convexity is strengthened here by showing that piecewise polyhedral concavity of the players' value functions implies i-upper semi-continuity.
This result is then used to show that Radzik's Theorem is a corollary of the version of Ziad's theorem presented in Theorem 7.
Proposition 12 If
. Hence, taking a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that x k j −i = x −i for all j ∈ N; clearly, this implies thatx
l=1 be a compact, convex cover of X −i such that V i is polyhedral quasiconcave on X l −i for all l = 1, . . . , L i . Since the cover is finite, we may assume that there exists l ∈ {1, . . . , L i } such thatx
By Lemma 9, there exist J > J 1 and sequences {x
We note that for two-player games on a square with piecewise quasi-concave payoff functions, each player has a piecewise polyhedral quasi-concave value function and so an i-upper semi-continuous payoff function. Indeed, since, for all i = 1, 2, both X i and X −i are contained in R, every convex, compact subset of X i or X −i is a polytope.
In particular, X i and
l=1 is a compact, convex cover of X −i , then X l −i is a polytope and so are the upper sets
Thus, combining this observation with Ziad's theorem, we obtain the main result in Radzik (1991) . 
Concluding Remarks
The approach for the existence results discussed in this note relies on the lower hemicontinuity of the ε-best reply correspondence. As the example in Section 3 shows, this condition may fail even if the game satisfies the assumptions in Ziad (1997) .
Nevertheless, we have shown that this problem can be solved by assuming that players' action spaces are polytopes. Furthermore, we show that if an upper semi-continuous game is such that the upper sets of players' payoff functions are polytopes (or at least it satisfies a generalization of this condition), then it has an ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0.
The drawback of this note is that it does not answer the question of whether or not Ziad's theorem holds as it was stated originally. For instance, it is clear that the game presented in Section 2 has Nash equilibria. Moreover, so does the game presented at the end of Section 2 and obtained by modifying the original example so that players' payoff functions are not i-upper semi-continuous. In fact, one can conjecture that every game with nonempty, compact, convex and finite-dimensional action spaces and with upper semi-continuous and piecewise quasi-concave payoff functions have ε-equilibria for all ε > 0.
Although no answer to the above conjecture will be offered, we note that the problem can be simplified by reducing it to games with finite-valued payoff functions.
In fact, if G is a game satisfying the above properties, we can first normalize payoffs
